olesonhistoriography

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History 411
12 November = 2002=20

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"The Austrian Initiative: Jumpstarting Treaty=20 Negotiations"

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On 15 May 1955 at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, the Austrian=20 government and the four occupying powers of France, Great Britain, the = Soviet=20 Union, and the United States signed the Austrian State Treaty, ending = ten years=20 of foreign occupation. This act came at the height of the Cold War = and=20 procured the first withdrawal of troops by the Soviet Union from = territory it=20 had conquered in World War II. At the conclusion of war in 1945, = the=20 Allied forces marched into Austria with the Soviet Red Army occupying = the=20 eastern portion of the country and British, French, and American troops = taking=20 control of western areas. An Allied Commission for Austria was = established=20 to administer the country, in conjunction with a democratically elected = Austrian=20 government. As early as 1946 discussions for a treaty on the = future of=20 Austria had begun among the Allies, when the Council of Foreign = Ministers (CFM)=20 created a committee of Deputies to work on a draft of the = treaty. In=20 the course of the ten-year occupation, there were several moments when = the=20 signing of a treaty appeared imminent but failed for multiple = reasons. The=20 greatest missed opportunity came in 1949 when the Soviets were willing = to sign=20 the treaty but the Western Allies, and the United States in particular, = could=20 not agree on a response. After the failure of 1949, progress = on the=20 treaty essentially stalled, as the CFM did not meet again until=20 1954. The CFM meeting in Berlin in 1954 was one of several = important=20 events during the key years from 1953 to 1955. The year 1953 = produced=20 several political changes of great significance to the negotiations over = the=20 Austrian State Treaty. In January 1953, the Eisenhower = administration took=20 over control of the White House. Less than two months later on 5 = March=20 1953, Joseph Stalin died, ending approximately twenty-five years of = dictatorial=20 rule. March also brought the election of a new Austrian government = under=20 the chancellorship of Julius Raab. In this new environment, the = Austrians=20 approached the Soviets in bilateral treaty talks in 1953, and the Berlin = CFM met=20 in early 1954. After a lull in activity, Nikita S. Khrushchev = consolidated=20 his power as leader of the Soviet Union in 1955, which led to a new line = of=20 Soviet foreign policy. In April 1955, the Austrians again entered = into=20 bilateral talks with the Soviets, and one month later the Austrian State = Treaty=20 had been signed. The turning point with regard to the treaty came = when the=20 Austrians accepted the Soviet invitation to Moscow in the spring of = 1955. =20 The bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and Austria were the = direct=20 catalyst that propelled the four occupying powers and Austria to sign = the=20 Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955.
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The historiography on the Austrian State Treaty breaks down = into three=20 main categories: an American, a Soviet, and an Austrian angle. = This does=20 not mean that the historians necessarily fall into these categories = based upon=20 nationality or that the boundaries between these categories are = solid. The=20 historians instead argue the importance of the actors and events based = on the=20 role of the Americans, Soviets, or Austrians in creating the Austrian = State=20 Treaty. There is also a gray area for some historians, who do not = restrict=20 themselves to emphasizing only one political aspect, but recognize that = the=20 Austrian treaty required a concerted effort.
One school of=20 historiography focuses on the role of the Americans in the = negotiations. =20 Stephen E. Ambrose, one of the leading biographers of Dwight D. = Eisenhower,=20 significantly emphasizes the President's role in the signing of the = Austrian=20 State Treaty. Ambrose lauds Eisenhower as ". . . the western = leader most=20 responsible for the restoration of Austrian freedom." He = bases this=20 assessment on the power of the President in the negotiation = process. In=20 Ambrose's analysis, "[w]hen Eisenhower stepped forward and offered a = deal - a=20 summit for Austria's freedom - the troika [Bulganin, Khrushchev, = and=20 Zhukov] overcame their reluctance and on May 15, 1955, signed the = Austrian=20 treaty." While Eisenhower, as leader of the United States,=20 undoubtedly played a role in the signing of the Austrian treaty, Ambrose = takes a=20 very narrow view of the treaty negotiations. He focuses on the top = level=20 of American power, thus excluding key figures and events from the Soviet = and=20 Austrian sides, as well as other American negotiators. Frederick W. = Marks III=20 shares Ambrose's view that the Americans were the crucial players in the = negotiations. Marks focuses, however, on a different figure in = terms of=20 American foreign policy. As a biographer of John Foster Dulles, he = credits=20 the Secretary of State with pushing the treaty toward a positive = conclusion for=20 both the Americans and the Austrians. Where Ambrose writes, ". . . = Eisenhower's most enduring foreign policy contributions were a free = Austria . .=20 .," Marks counters with ". . . even to this day, the most astute = observers=20 of the Eisenhower presidency still find it difficult to say who was at = the helm=20 of American foreign policy from 1953 to 1959." Marks = contends that=20 "Dulles has never received as much as half the recognition he deserves = for his=20 role in obtaining the Austrian State Treaty . . .." He = credits=20 Dulles' hard bargaining and delay tactics with the Soviets for producing = the=20 treaty. Marks even uses the anecdote that Dulles "ordered = his plane=20 readied for the trip home" should the Soviets not reduce their = demands on=20 the day the treaty was scheduled to be signed. While Marks certainly = brings the=20 contributions of Secretary of State Dulles to the forefront, he, too, = neglects=20 the work of the Soviets and Austrians in negotiating the treaty. = In=20 referring to Dulles' "eleventh-hour triumph . . . [as] the evacuation of = the Red=20 Armies from Austria," Marks ignores the fact that when the = Viennese=20 crowds came to cheer the signing of the treaty, they were also = celebrating the=20 newly achieved independence of their country, including the withdrawal = of=20 American troops. Marks' analysis of Dulles is a one-sided = account of=20 the factors influencing the formation of the Austrian State Treaty. =
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The second major category in the historiography debate on the treaty = looks=20 at the role of the Soviet leaders and their motives for ending the = occupation of=20 Austria. The Czech historian Vojtech Mastny is one of the = strongest=20 proponents in support of the Soviet contribution to the treaty. In = his=20 article, in which he refers to the Soviets as the "Godfathers of = Austrian=20 Neutrality ", Mastny argues that "Austrian neutrality originated = in=20 Moscow. The 1955 State Treaty, which made neutrality possible, = could only=20 come about because the key Soviet leaders had changed their mind, and = finally=20 approved of a neutral status for Austria." He argues that = the=20 Soviets blocked progress on the treaty negotiations because they refused = to=20 separate the German and Austrian question. As Mastny notes, = however,=20 "[m]aking the Austrian settlement contingent upon the prior solution of = the=20 German question, and thus postponing both solutions indefinitely, was = integral=20 to that Stalinist tactic, whose obsolescence became clear by late=20 1954." By 1954 the stage was set for West Germany's = integration into=20 NATO, and Mastny argues that Soviet concerns about the expansion of NATO = led=20 them to seek the Austrian State Treaty. By signing a treaty in = return for=20 Austrian neutrality, the Soviets initiated ". . . political developments = calculated to diminish the cold war's military dimensions. . = .." He=20 also credits Khrushchev with developing this plan to counteract Western = military=20 expansion. Finally, Mastny recognizes the Austrians and the=20 surprising negotiating power they displayed at the bilateral talks in=20 Moscow. The majority of his article, however, centers on = Soviet=20 motives for signing the treaty. Gerald Stourzh, an Austrian = historian,=20 responds to Mastny's analysis with the argument: "If the Soviets were = the=20 godfathers, there was also a godmother, in the unlikely person of John = Foster=20 Dulles . . .." Stourzh credits the American Secretary of = State for=20 his proposal at the Berlin CFM in 1954, where he suggested that the = Western=20 powers would support a neutral Austria on the Swiss model. He then = notes=20 that "this became the Soviets' most persuasive argument in their = bilateral talks=20 with the Austrians in Moscow in April 1955 . . .." In = emphasizing=20 Dulles' suggestion, Stourzh refutes Mastny's claim that the Soviets were = responsible for Austrian neutrality. The Soviets instead used the = Dulles=20 proposal to negotiate with the Austrian during their bilateral talks in=20 Moscow. Stourzh also recognizes the Austrian initiative in turning = to the=20 Kremlin leaders for bilateral talks ". . . with a purpose of de-blocking = the=20 State Treaty issue." Stourzh is quick to point out, however, = that=20 "[t]he non-solution of the Austrian question in 1953 or 1954, and its = solution=20 in 1955 depended less on the lesser or greater weight of Austrian=20 'leverage,' and more on different power constellations and policy=20 determinations in the Kremlin . . .." Stourzh's ultimate = analysis=20 coincides with Mastny's interpretation of the political motive behind = the Soviet=20 signature on the treaty: "What was most essential . . . was the world = wide=20 attempt to push back American influence with political rather than = military=20 means . . .." While Stourzh provides a more balanced view of = the=20 contributors to the Austrian treaty, he leaves no doubt that without = Soviet=20 consent there would not have been a treaty in 1955.=20

Another Austrian historian, Michael Gehler, provides a different = perspective=20 on the motives of the Soviet Union in signing the Austrian State = Treaty. =20 Gehler remarks that ". . . for Kremlin decision makers the withdrawal of = occupation forces from the Soviet zone of Austria was designed to send a = strong=20 signal for initiating East-West detente in general and solve the German = question=20 in particular." He, too, emphasizes West Germany's impending = membership into NATO as a key factor in the decision by Soviet leaders = to=20 withdraw from Austria. Gehler argues that the Kremlin wanted to = use=20 Austria to create an alternative example for the Germans. "Even = though the=20 Paris Agreements of October 1954 had been signed, they still were = up for=20 ratification in the national parliaments in the spring of 1955. = With the=20 Austrian model for the German question, Kremlin diplomacy hoped to = derail the=20 ratification process." The Soviets hoped to lure the Germans = away=20 from Western integration and toward unification and neutrality on the = Austrian=20 model. Gehler notes, however, that Austria succeeded because = "[u]nlike the=20 Federal Republic of Germany, Austria did not put its faith in the hands = of other=20 powers but negotiated with Moscow on its own." The Austrian=20 government took a chance in going to Moscow for bilateral talks, but = "[t]he=20 courage to take risks paid off: Austria became independent and=20 free." Gehler recognizes that while the Soviets intended to = use the=20 Austrian treaty in a wider diplomatic context, the Austrians were the = ultimate=20 beneficiaries of Soviet policy.=20

An earlier look at the impact of Soviet policy on the Austrian = State=20 Treaty comes from the American historian William Bader. Bader = notes that=20 "[a]fter the death of Stalin in 1953, the style of the Soviet Union's = holding=20 action in Austria changed noticeably" but the changes ". . . did not = mean that=20 in 1953 Russia was willing to withdraw." While Stalin's = death=20 altered Soviet actions with regard to Austria, Bader also recognizes = that the=20 Berlin CFM in 1954 indicated that the Soviet leaders were not yet ready = to=20 negotiate solely over Austria but that they intended to link the = Austrian=20 question together with that of Germany. "Not a year later, = however,=20 came the volte-face of February 8, 1955, and the door was opened = to an=20 Austrian settlement . . .." Bader acknowledges the = significance of=20 this event in the broader context of Soviet strategy and considers the = Austrian=20 treaty to be part of Khrushchev's larger plan to initiate East-West=20 d=E9tente. In a further analysis of Soviet policy, Bader = also looks at=20 the Soviet signature on the treaty as attempting to create a model for = other=20 European countries. He remarks that "[t]he most compelling = justifications=20 for Khrushchev's action, however, . . . [was] a long-term calculation = that the=20 Austrian settlement would serve as a model - an inducement for some to = accept=20 demilitarization, for others to point up the advantages of staying out = of=20 military alliances." Bader's analysis also critiques Dulles = and the=20 American role in the treaty, noting that "[i]n the Austrian case the = United=20 States only grudgingly came to accept the idea of = neutrality." =20 Bader, however, does not give the Austrians any credit for their = involvement in=20 seeking a treaty.=20

Writing twenty years after Bader, Audrey Kurth Cronin reaches = the same=20 conclusion on the importance of Stalin's death. In her assessment, = the=20 death of the Soviet leader not only brought power changes in the Kremlin = but=20 also foreign policy changes, particularly concerning the occupation of=20 Austria. Cronin notes, however, that even in the wake of the = power=20 changes, "[t]he disagreement over Austria's future often had little to = do with=20 Austria itself and much more to do with the course of the Cold = War." =20 Cronin emphasizes, as other historians also have, that Austria is part = of the=20 broader issue of the Western integration of the Federal Republic of = Germany, and=20 the Soviets refused to separate the two questions. Her hypothesis = is that=20 "[h]ad Soviet threats concerning the future of Austria succeeded in = putting off=20 German rearmament, the Austrian State Treaty would probably not have = been signed=20 in May 1955." Cronin thus minimizes the role of the Western = powers=20 in favor of the importance of Soviet decisions. "[I]nternal Soviet = considerations and events outside Austria" played a larger part in the = signing=20 of the treaty than any of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and = the=20 Western Allies. In her analysis, the key figure in the = Soviet=20 decision-making process was Nikita Khrushchev, who intended ". . . to = use the=20 treaty to initiate an East-West d=E9tente in Europe." Cronin = also=20 addresses the role of the Austrian government in the negotiations. = "Although Austria never controlled its own fate, in the early 1950s the=20 Austrians occasionally exercised a leverage with respect to the Western = powers=20 which was out of proportion to the small country's strength."=20

The Austrian historian G=FCnter Bischof's assessment of the = role the=20 Austrians played in procuring their own freedom forms the final category = of=20 historiography. Bischof's argument for the importance of the = Austrians in=20 negotiating their own independence begins with the death of Stalin and = "[h]is=20 successors [who] signalled a departure of post-Stalinist foreign policy = towards=20 'peaceful coexistence'." This change prompted Austrian = Chancellor=20 Julius Raab to test "the Soviets in bilateral contacts to explore the = meaning of=20 'peaceful coexistence' for Austria." Bischof then credits = Raab with=20 proposing ". . . neutrality as a means of getting rid of the occupation=20 powers." In Bischof's analysis, Khrushchev's willingness to=20 negotiate with the Austrians in Moscow was merely ". . . the culmination = of=20 Raab's bilateral diplomacy." Thus, Bischof's conclusion is = that=20 "Austria's risky diplomacy and hard-won independence in 1955 = demonstrated to the=20 world that the weak had leverage in the Cold War." Bischof = regards=20 as necessary Austria's initiative on the matter of bilateral = negotiations to=20 achieve a treaty because the Western powers were slow in reacting to the = Soviets. He criticizes American foreign policy, noting that = "Eisenhower=20 refused to negotiate with the Kremlin leadership, let alone meet them on = the=20 summit level to test the sincerity of their peace = offensive." =20 Without the Austrians, Bischof's argument indicates that there may not = have been=20 a treaty in 1955. In the introduction to his book, G=FCnter Bischof = discusses the=20 recent changes in Cold War scholarship. He notes that new = historiography=20 largely looks at new sources, including German language scholarship and = the=20 mostly untapped archival sources in Moscow. This shift in=20 historiography occurs in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the fall of = communism across Europe. Bishop also criticizes "[t]raditional = American=20 Cold War scholarship [that] has largely ignored Austria as an important = case=20 study contributing to the origins of the Cold War and aggravating = East-West=20 conflict." Stephen Ambrose and Frederick Marks fall into = this=20 classification. They barely touch on the role of Austria in the = Cold War,=20 and when they do, it is only to praise their subjects (Eisenhower and = Dulles)=20 for solving the Austrian question. The American historian Bader, = writing=20 in the mid-1960s, also leaves the Austrian leaders out of his analysis = of Soviet=20 and American actions in treaty negotiations. The other historians = have=20 tried to touch upon multiple factors in their assessment of the = formation of the=20 treaty. Bischof probably goes the farthest by crediting the = Austrians with=20 attaining their treaty. Stourzh and Cronin provide a more balanced = view,=20 recognizing that without the Austrian initiative, the lull in treaty=20 negotiations may very well have continued. Their assessment that = the power=20 to make a decision on Austria was always with the Soviets is perhaps the = most=20 legitimate. The Austrian acceptance of Moscow's invitation for = bilateral=20 talks in April 1955 jumpstarted the process of negotiations, but the = Soviets=20 always maintained the upper hand.

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Works Cited
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Secondary Sources=20

Ambrose, Stephen E. "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1950s." = In=20 Contemporary Austrian
Studies, ed. Erich Th=F6ni, et al. Vol. = 3, Austria=20 in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. G=FCnter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf = Steininger,=20 12-23. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995.=20

Bader, William B. Austria Between East and West = 1945-1955. =20 Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1966.=20

Bischof, G=FCnter. Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The = Leverage=20 of the Weak.
Cold War History Series, ed. Saki Dockrill. New = York: St.=20 Martin's Press, 1999.=20

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "East-West Negotiations over Austria in = 1949:=20 Turning-Point in
the Cold War." Journal of Contemporary = History 24,=20 no. 1 (January 1989): 125-45. Database on-line. Available = from JSTOR=20 <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=3D0022-0094%28198901%2924%3A1%3C125%= 3AENOAI1%3E2.0.0CO%3B2-2>=20 [30 September 2002].=20

________. Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria,=20 1945-1955.
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, ed. Robert J. Art = and Robert=20 Jervis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.=20

Gehler, Michael. "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian = Solution in=20 1955 as a
'Model' for Germany?." In Contemporary Austrian Studies, = ed. Erich=20 Th=F6ni, et al. Vol. 3, Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, ed. = G=FCnter Bischof,=20 Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger, 39-78. New Brunswick, NJ: = Transaction=20 Publishers, 1995.=20

Marks, Frederick W. III. Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John = Foster=20 Dulles.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993.=20

Mastny, Vojtech. "The Soviet Godfathers of Austrian = Neutrality." =20 In Contemporary
Austrian Studies, ed. G=FCnter Bischof, et al. = Vol. 9,=20 Neutrality in Austria, ed. G=FCnter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth = Wodak,=20 240-50. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001.=20

Stourzh, Gerald. "Reply to the Commentators." In Contemporary = Austrian=20 Studies,
ed. G=FCnter Bischof, et al. Vol. 9, Neutrality in = Austria, ed.=20 G=FCnter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, 278-92. New = Brunswick, NJ:=20 Transaction Publishers, 2001.