cusickhistoriography

From: Subject: cusickhistoriography Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 20:59:34 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://userpages.wittenberg.edu/alivingstone/411/cusickhistoriography.html X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2180 cusickhistoriography      On April 18, 1942, eighty men embarked on = one of=20 the most extraordinary and daring air raids in American History. = Undoubtedly,=20 most historians view the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo as an example of = bravery and=20 ingenuity present in the United States military during World War = II. As=20 General Doolittle remarked, =93I was proud of my crew and all the other = volunteers=20 who were willing to lay their lives on the line for a risky mission that = I could=20 not tell them about until we were on the carrier.=94   = Although the=20 bravery and heroism of the mission leaves no doubt, there is a great = deal of=20 debate regarding the success and impact of the mission. Most histories = of the=20 Doolittle Raid credit the mission with raising American morale, lowering = Japanese morale and confidence, and precipitating the Battle of Midway, = which=20 the Japanese lost. The difference between these histories rests = with the=20 emphasis the historian places on each positive consequence of the raid, = and the=20 extent to which the historian acknowledges the negative results of the=20 raid. Carroll Glines, the most distinguished scholar of the = Doolittle=20 Raid, argues that the psychological effect on the Japanese public and = military=20 was the most important result of the mission. James Merrill and others = make a=20 case that the rise in American morale was the most important part of the = mission. The final group of historians question the true success of the=20 Doolittle Raid. They weigh its positives against its negatives in = alerting the=20 Japanese and causing thousands of deaths to the Chinese. In all, = the=20 historiography of the Doolittle Raid starts with the foundation set by = Carroll=20 Glines. Historians researching the
Doolittle Raid, begin their = research by=20 analyzing the psychological effects of the mission. Although not=20 explicitly aimed at explaining the Doolittle Raid, John Dower sheds = light=20

on America=92s anger and need for revenge against the=20 Japanese. Dower=92s research combined with Merrill=92s history = provides a=20 great base for the thesis of this paper. The Doolittle Raid = relieved=20 America=92s strong desire for revenge and provided a significant morale = boost that=20 pushed the United States to victory in the Pacific. =
    =20 Carroll Glines is the foremost scholar on the Doolitle Raid and has = spent much=20 of his life writing books related to the topic. A World War II veteran = himself,=20 Glines hails the raid as an important part of American victory in the = Pacific.=20 Glines=92s most prominent work, Doolittle=92s Tokyo Raiders, was the = first=20 comprehensive and analytical book written solely on the Tokyo Raid. This = 1964=20 book made Glines=92 interpretation fundamental to researching and = analyzing the=20 Doolittle Raid. Glines emphasizes the psychological impact the raid had = on the=20 entire country of Japan. He states, =93the impact on Japanese = morale, the=20 primary objective of the raid, was considerable.=94   In his = view, the=20 Doolittle Raid completely changed the mindset of the Japanese people. = Before the=20 war, they were confident in their leadership and safety of their = homeland. =20 The Japanese believed they could defeat America as they continued to = hear about=20 the victories of their military. From Pearl Harbor onward, the = Japanese=20 continued to dominate without any strong display of Allied=20 resistance.   After the Tokyo Raid, =93The psychological = effect was a=20 creeping, insidious realization that, in spite of propaganda to the = contrary,=20 the confidence of the people was severely shaken.=94   Doubt = began to=20 enter their minds, and they lost
confidence in their government and=20 military. The Japanese government recognized the negative effect = this=20 could have, and continued to produce propaganda that would alter the = impact of=20 the raid.   The military leaders also experienced the negative = psychological effects of the Doolittle Raid. In Doolittle=92s Tokyo = Raiders,=20 Glines points out the anger and shock the raid caused to Admiral Isoruku = Yamamoto and other leaders. As a direct result of the Doolittle = Raid,=20 Yamamoto moved to take possession of Midway Islands and secure the = Japanese=20 position in the Pacific. This raid proved to be disastrous for the = Japanese and was a major turning point in the war. =
    =20 Glines=92 analysis of the Doolittle Raid=92s psychological effects has = remained=20 constant throughout his works. In his 1984 book, The Doolittle = Raid:=20 America=92s Daring First Strike Against Japan, Glines continues to focus = on the=20 negative psychological effects of the raid on the Japanese citizens and = leaders.=20 Using much of the same language from his 1964 book, Glines adds a little = emphasis to the immediate effect of the Doolittle Raid on the Japanese=20 government. In the philosophy of the Japanese government, losing = credibility to=20 the public was a catastrophe. Glines sums up his place in the = Doolittle=20 Raid historiography by stating, =93the psychological after-effects and = the fact=20 that the Battle of Midway might not have been fought except for the = Doolittle=20 raid are the real reasons this single air raid has become a legend and = deserves=20 to be remembered.=94 Glines focuses on the psychological effects = because he=20 believes that is the most important impact of the
Doolittle Raid. = Little=20 physical damage resulted from the Tokyo Raid, but the
psychological = damage=20 on the Japanese led them to a decisive defeat in the Pacific. =
Glines=92=20 emphasis on the psychological effects of the raid has pushed other = historians to=20

begin their research in this area. =
    =20 Many other scholars have continued in Glines=92 footsteps in writing = about the=20 Doolittle Raid. Duane Schultz, John Keegan, and Janusz = Piskalkiewicz have=20 focused their history on the raid=92s impact in changing the course of = the=20 war. They have concentrated on the raid=92s psychological impact = on Japanese=20 military leaders in persuading them to initiate the Battle of Midway. = These=20 historians base their ideas on Gline=92s foundation, and continue to = support his=20 arguments. Although Schultz, Keegan, and Piskalkiewicz place little = emphasis on=20 the Japanese citizen, they follow Glines=92 analysis that the Doolittle = Raid=20 forced the Japanese into a decisive defeat in the Pacific. Duane = Schultz=20 examines Admiral Yamamoto and his personal sense of failure, by quoting=20 Yamamoto=92s biographer. Yamamoto=92s =93normally clear judgment was = warped by the=20 Doolittle Raid.=94 Everything Yamamoto was assigned to protect = seemed to=20 have been destroyed. This created a sense of urgency for Yamamoto = to=20 increase Japan=92s defensive capabilities. Schultz argues that this led = Yamamoto=20 to prematurely push for the battle of Midway, which was a pivotal and = decisive=20 battle in the War in the Pacific.   Like most scholars, = Schultz=20 acknowledges other effects of the Doolittle Raid, including the boost it = provided for American morale.   However, Schultz makes very = clear in=20 his introductory summary that the primary success of the Doolittle Raid = was the=20 psychological blow it provided to the military leaders of Japan. This = blow=20 caused the course of the war to be forever altered
in the Battle of=20 Midway. Like many scholars writing about the Doolittle Raid, =
Schultz=20 bases his interpretations on the foundation established by Carroll = Glines.=20
     John Keegan agrees with this interpretation = and=20 states that the Doolittle Raid =93might have been judged a fiasco if it = had not=20 registered with the Japanese high command.=94 Keegan dismisses the = psychological effect on the Japanese citizens and emphasizes the = influence the=20 Doolittle Raid had in pushing the Japanese high command to =93provoke a = decisive=20 battle=94 at Midway Island.    Although the Doolittle = Raid was not=20 the only reason Japan moved to Midway, Keegan writes that it was an = important=20 factor in turning the tides of war in the Pacific. Janusz = Piekalkiewicz=20 also emphasizes the psychological effect the Doolittle Raid had on = Japanese=20 military leaders. Piekalkiewicz states that the raid scared the = Japanese=20 high command and caused them to focus more on defending their homeland. = In his=20 view, the raid was extremely important in causing Japan to bring forces = back to=20 protect their homeland and to set a date for the Battle of = Midway.  =20 Carroll Glines was extremely influential in emphasizing the = psychological=20 effects the Doolittle Raid had on Japanese citizens and high = command. His=20 research and history has helped to solidify the importance of the = Doolittle Raid=20 in changing the course of war. Many other historians have followed in = his=20 footsteps and have further outlined the importance of the Doolittle Raid = in=20 precipitating the Battle of Midway. Although some historian=92s have = questioned=20 the strength of this connection, most historians acknowledge that the = Doolittle=20 Raid had some effect in causing this important naval battle.=20
     Other historians have argued that the main = success=20 of the Doolittle Raid was its ability to raise American morale in a time = of=20 need. The pioneer and leader of this philosophy is James = Merrill. =20 Merrill writes about the many other accomplishments of the Tokyo Raid, = but=20 focuses on its significance in providing good news to Americans and = shifting the=20 momentum of war in the Pacific. Like Glines, Merrill emphasizes the=20 psychological effects of the raid. In his 1964 book Target Tokyo, = Merrill=20 discusses the barrage of negative news following Pearl Harbor. The = numerous problems caused Americans to become concerned about their = military=20 strength in the Pacific.   Merrill connects the negative news = for the=20 allies and the United States, to a strong need for something good to=20 happen. As military defeats continued to take place, this need = grew in=20 urgency and importance. Merrill states that public =93concern = intensified by=20 the death of the British battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse off = Malaya in=20 the Gulf of Siam.=94   In Merrill=92s interpretation, the most = influential=20 impact of the Doolittle Raid was its success in breaking this string of = bad news=20 and setbacks. It created an end to American military problems and = started=20 a large string of successes in the war against Japan. Momentum = shifted,=20 morale soared, and the United States used the Doolittle Raid to push for = further=20 success. Merrill writes. =93The Eighteenth of April, like a false = dawn, held=20 the promise of eventual victory in the Pacific.=94 Americans = sensed this=20 promise and gained an increased confidence in their military and ability = to=20 achieve victory.
     Other historians have also = followed in Merrill=92s interpretation of the Doolittle Raid. = Although C.L.=20 Sulzberger and B.H. Liddell Hart write more general histories of World =
War=20 II, they still argue that the most important result of the Doolittle = Raid was=20 the lift it provided to American morale and confidence. Written after = 1964,=20 these histories continue in Glines=92 lead and focus on the = psychological effects=20 of the raid. However, they support Merrill=92s argument that the = greatest=20 psychological impact was with the Americans. Sulzberger also emphasizes = the bad=20 news and failures of the American military in the first months of the = war. The=20 first part of 1942 offered little hope and encouragement for the = American=20 public, with news of the U-boats sinkings, defeat in Luzon, and the = destruction=20 of large parts of the allied fleets.   Sulzberger states, = =93It was=20 clearly necessary for Americans to prove to themselves that they were = capable of=20 hitting back, and to prove to the Japanese that they would suffer for = their=20 imprudence.=94   The Doolittle Raid offered this proof to the = American=20 public and military. Although Sulzberger writes that the Doolittle = Raid=20 did not directly change the course of war, he concludes that it provided = an=20 important psychological lift to Americans.   In his book, = History of=20 the Second World War, B.H. Liddell Hart credits the Doolittle Raid with=20 significantly raising American morale, and forcing Japan to concentrate = more on=20 the defense of their country and surrounding islands. Even so, = Liddell=20 Hart writes, =93The prime result of the raid was the fillip it gave to = American=20 morale, which had been badly shaken by Pearl Harbor.=94 This raid = gave the=20 United States a lift and provided momentum for the rest of the = war. =20 Liddell Hart writes only two pages about the Doolittle Raid in his seven = hundred-page history of World War II. Despite this, Liddell Hart = describes the=20 Tokyo Raid as one part of the puzzle that changed the course of war for = the=20 Americans and Allies. Merrill, Sulzberger,
and Liddell Hart = all argue=20 that the most important effect of the Doolittle Raid was the = psychological boost=20 it provided to American momentum, confidence, and morale. This = view on the=20 Doolittle Raid remains an influential part of its historiography.=20
     Although most historians recognize the = successes of=20 the Doolittle Raid, many also acknowledge the negative effects of the=20 raid. Even Glines, the most glorifying historian of the raid, = recognizes=20 the devastating after effects on the Chinese. In Doolittle=92s = Tokyo=20 Raiders, Glines includes a chapter entitled =93The Chinese Help=85And = Suffer the=20 Consequences.=94 This chapter describes the horrific punishments and = deaths the=20 Japanese inflicted on the Chinese for helping the Doolittle = Raiders. In=20 one account, the Japanese captured the man who had harbored Lieutenant = Watson,=20 =93wrapped him up in some blankets, poured the oil of the lamp on him = and obliged=20 his wife to set fire to the human torch.=94 Glines includes this = example to=20 show the swift and horrific revenge the Japanese pursued as a result of = the=20 Doolittle Raid. This shows that the impact of the Doolittle Raid = was not=20 all positive. In his 1984 book, Glines provides even more details = and=20 statistics regarding the plight of the Chinese. He uses Chiang Kai = Shek=92s=20 statements, government records, and General Claire Chennault=92s = observations, to=20 portray the cruel three-month campaign that claimed the lives of = approximately=20 two hundred fifty thousand Chinese. Many innocent people were = killed, and=20 Glines recognizes that it was an effect of the Doolittle Raid. In = examining the=20 Doolittle Raid, Glines says that =93it is the aftermath of Japanese = terror and=20 brutality, which has few equals in modern military history, that =
provides a=20 reminder for all of man=92s capacity for all of man=92s capacity for = cruelty to his=20 fellow man.=94 Even so, he blames the Japanese, and still credits = the=20 Doolittle Raid as an integral part of American victory in the Pacific.=20
     Other historians weigh the negative effects = of the=20 Doolittle Raid more heavily. Donald Miller strongly considers the = negative=20 effects of the raid in his history of World War II. Although Miller = credits the=20 raid with raising American morale, he discusses the executions of three=20 Americans and the death of a quarter million Chinese.   He = links these=20 deaths to the Doolittle Raid and questions whether we should really = consider it=20 a success. Miller never explicitly states his opinion of the = Doolittle=20 Raid, but infers that it created more harm than success. In Samuel = Eliot=20 Morison=92s book, Strategy and Compromise, he portrays the Doolittle = Raid as=20 =93spectacular=94, but with little real impact on the war.   = In other=20 words, it was a show of bravery that was not strategically significance = in the=20 grand scheme of World War II. Morison continues to write that the = raid=20 =93probably did us more harm, by putting the enemy on his guard, than it = did us=20 good in lessons learned.=94 In this statement, Morison directly = refutes the=20 notions of Glines and other scholars who claim that an important effect = of the=20 raid was to make Japan more defensive. Similar to Glines, Miller = and=20 Morison acknowledge the negative effects of the Doolittle Raid. In = contrast, they emphasize these effects more heavily and infer that the = Tokyo=20 Raid was not a success.
     Recent newspaper = articles=20 on the Doolittle Raid tend to glorify and emphasize the bravery of the = Doolittle=20 Raiders. Much of this recent attention is due to the fact that the raid = was=20 nearing its sixtieth anniversary. In a 2002 article appearing in the = Houston=20 Chronicle, Jeff Wilkinson writes very nostalgically about the Doolittle = Raiders=20 and their contributions to the country. He writes, =93They lifted = American=20 fighting spirit when it was at its lowest ebb, giving the country hope = for the=20 long struggle ahead.=94   Wilkinson tells the story of the = Doolittle=20 Raid in a way that expresses his appreciation, respect, and awe of their = bravery. He portrays the raiders as long shots who made = significant=20 contributions to American victory in the Pacific. Agreeing with = Merrill=92s=20 interpretation of the raid, Wilkinson portrays the amazing boost in = morale the=20 Doolittle Raid provided. In a 2002 Boston Herald article, Tom = Farmer also=20 writes about the tremendous success of the Doolittle Raid. Farmer = depicts=20 Doolittle and the raiders as national heroes and symbols of = bravery. In=20 his view, the raid was successful in boosting morale, causing the = Japanese to be=20 more defensive, to hurry into the Battle of Midway. This threefold = success=20 was highlighted by the raid=92s ability to boost spirits and change the = attitude=20 of the American people. Farmer includes part of an interview with = Doolittle=20 Raider Royden Stork, which exemplifies his point that the Doolittle Raid = provided a huge emotional lift to America.   In their = articles,=20 Wilkinson and Farmer repeat a great deal of the historiography on the = Doolittle=20 Raid. Although they agree with Merrill=92s interpretation about = the primary=20 effect of raid, they tend to mirror Glines=92 glorification of the raid. =
     Jichuan Wang expressed his concern about = this type=20 of glorification in a recent article in the Dayton Daily News. He=20 discusses the recent depictions of the raid, including the silver screen = portrayal in Pearl Harbor. Recent articles and the movies have glorified = the=20 American bravery and success of the mission, but have failed to = acknowledge the=20 role of the Chinese. Wang asks the question, =93What price did the = Chinese pay for=20 rescuing the American pilots?=94    He refers to the fact = that two=20 hundred and fifty thousand Chinese were killed as a result of the raid, = and=20 compares this number to the under ten thousand Allied soldiers that were = killed=20 on D-Day. The Chinese suffered greatly as a result of the = Doolittle Raid,=20 and Wang states that they should be given some credit. Wang also infers = that the=20 large number of Chinese casualties might suggest that the Doolittle Raid = was not=20 quite the success that it has been portrayed as in recent articles in = movies.=20 Recent history and articles on the Doolittle Raid have tended to place = an=20 increased significance on the bravery and impact of the Doolittle Raid. = Wang=92s=20 article is a call to step back and analyze the larger picture of the = historic=20 Tokyo Raid. Only time will tell how historians respond to this = type of=20 argument. As the plight of the Chinese becomes better known, = historians=20 will surely pay more attention to their important role in the Doolittle = Raid.=20
     The historiography of the Doolittle Raid = has=20 contributed different interpretations regarding the impact and legacy of = the=20 daring mission. Carroll Glines has provided the foundation for = interpretation of=20 the Doolittle Raid and has encouraged most historians in this field to = consider=20 the psychological effects of the mission. Important insight into the = impact of=20 the Doolittle Raid has come from historian John Dower. In his = book, War=20 Without Mercy, Dower describes the strong hatred for the Japanese that = appeared=20 after Pearl Harbor.   The Japanese were viewed as evil, = sneaky,=20 conniving, primitive, and most of all =93treacherous.=94 These = feelings=20 continued to grow as Japan remained aggressive and on the attack. = As a=20 result of Japan=92s surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Americans developed = =93a thirst=20 for revenge=94 that the Japanese never anticipated. Dower provides = a=20 powerful description of the climate that fostered the creation of the = Doolittle=20 Raid. The American public, military leaders, and President = Roosevelt=20 called for revenge against the Japanese, and would not relent until this = objective was achieved. Mixing Dower=92s ideas with the philosophy of = James=20 Merrill produces an argument that will be the central focus of this = paper. =20 The Doolittle Raid satisfied America=92s need for revenge against the = Japanese and=20 provided a morale boost that propelled the United States to victory in = the=20 Pacific.

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