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People sometimes criticize us for using complicated words
"to be trendy." That's not just malicious, it's stupid.
A concept sometimes needs a new word to express it, sometimes
it uses an everyday word that gives it a singular sense. -- Gilles Deleuze
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Agency
In a broad sense, agency refers to the
capacity to act. For example in traditional adventure narratives,
the male typically acts while women admire or reflect on men's
actions. As this example indicates, agency is relative (women
also act, but in a subordinate capacity), and often split along
gender lines, especially before the influence of Second Wave
Feminism. "Sexual Agency" refers to a person who asserts
their desires (the sexual agent) as opposed to the sexual object.
(Hedges)
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Amodern
A term used by Bruno
Latour to challenge the concepts that undergird modernist
thought, while the same time avoiding the facile assumptions
he believes are usually associated with "post-modernism."
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Anagnorisis
Also see Aristotle:
Key Concepts
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Axiology
The branch of literary and cultural
analysis that deals with evaluation, and tries to determine if
something is "good" or "bad" and why. This
activity is what many people (unfortunately) think of when they
hear the term "criticism." A critic's job, in this
popular image, is to criticize: not to think about something's
meaning, but to tell us how it fails. (Hedges)
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Binary
Opposition
A pair of terms differentiated by their
opposition to one another. Examples would include yin/yang, light/dark,
masculine/feminine, up/down, and gay/straight, but also more
subtle oppositions such as sea blue/cyan, vigilante/villain,
and slacker/stoner. Saussure's linguistics imply that all language
is organized by binary oppositions, and Derrida's thought maintains that these oppositions are
unstable. Deconstruction demonstrates this underlying instability or
play in binary oppositions. (Hedges)
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Camp
A cultural practice that takes norms
and standards so seriously that they become ridiculous and the
privileges attached to them unreasonable. See Reflections
on Camp and the Irony
Taxonomy (Hedges)
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Catharsis / Katharsis
Also see Aristotle:
Key Concepts
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Closure
When a work has a sense of finality,
completeness, and resolution when you finish it, we say that
it has a high degree of closure. If there is a sense that all
the loose ends have not been tied up, and that issues remain
unresolved or perhaps unresolvable, then we say it resists closure
or doesn't have much closure. A play or novel where everyone
is happily married at the end and vilians are disposed of has
a lot of closure. A TV series like the X-files has very
little closure. (Hedges)
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Diachronic/Synchronic
A diachronic approach involves an examination
of origins, development, history and change. For example if we
examine the etymology of a word, or the development of a genre.
Diachronic approaches give us a history, like a motion picture
documentary. They focus on how things change over time.
(Hedges)
In contrast, a synchronic approach gives
us a snapshot of a particular system at a particular moment in
time, like a snapshot. For example we might note how a word is
distinguished from other words at the moment. Synchronic approaches
focus on how a given system is at a given moment and how each
part fits into the system. Structuralism relies on a synchronic approach. (Hedges)
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Discourse
Michel Foucault
uses this term for an authoritative way of describing. Discourses
are propagated by specific institutions and divide up the world
in specific ways. For example, we can talk of medical, legal,
and psychological discourses. Literary criticism is also a discourse,
as is the terminology associated with grading. (Hedges)
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Egalitarian Fallacy
A term coined by Barbara Herrnstein Smith to critique the
notion that "relativism" implies all opinions are equally
valid. In her 1998 book, Belief & Resistance, she
describes it as follows: "much of the sense of intellectual
and moral scandal evoked by the charge of "relativism"
derives from a supposed implication . . . that, according to
the skeptical or unorthodox doctrine in question, everything-every
opinion, every scientific theory, every artwork, every social
practice, and so on- is 'just as good' as every other
I call this general supposition and argument the Egalitarian
Fallacy. It is a fallacy because, if someone rejects the notion
of validity in the classic (objectivist) sense, what follows
is not that she thinks all theories (and so on) are equally valid
but that she thinks no theory (and so on) is valid in the classic
sense. The non sequitur here is the product of the common and
commonly unshakable conviction that differences of "better"
and "worse" must be objective or could not otherwise
be measured. When appealed to in the argument the conviction
is obviously question-begging" (77-78).
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Essentialism
The notion that some "core"
meaning or identity is determinate and not subject to interpretation.
(For example, a crayon that is always "green" regardless
of other crayons it is placed with, would be "essentially"
green--no matter what its context.) Essentialism usually comes
up in debates about personal
identity. Is there, for instance, an
essential "feminine" that transcends histories and
cultures? (Hedges)
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Gothic
In
literary and cultural studies, the gothic is a genre or mode
whose dark imagery often includes medieval ruins, supernatural
occurrences, and demonic protagonists. Gothic themes usually
emphasize the persistence of the past and history's grip on the
present (as opposed to rosier views of human progress and the
possibility of social perfection), and take place against a backdrop
where few characters are innocent, and most of them are damned.
Gothic narratives often stress embodiment, with all its attendant
possibilities for sensation, as well as the fear of mortification
and decay. Gothic narratives also typically explore themes that
are otherwise cordoned off as unnatural or perverse (consider,
for example, Frankenstein's unnatural monster, or Batman's rubber
suit). (Hedges)
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Hamartia
Also see Aristotle:
Key Concepts
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Intentional
Fallacy
A name the New
Critics gave to the belief that an
author's intentions (stated or inferred) is the final court of
appeal about the meaning of a text. There are two main objections
to this commonsense belief: 1> How do you determine an author's
intent, especially if they are dead? 2> People often express
things they don't intend to; subconscious or other meanings may
slip out. This is not to say that an author's intentions are
irrelevant to the text, but that any statements about her or
his intent must be subjected to the same scrutiny and are subject
to the same interpretive process as the text itself. (Hedges)
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Irony
Also see the Irony
Taxonomy
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Male Gaze
A film theory widely circulated during
the mid to late 1980s. It posited that the camera structured
things from a male viewpoint, inviting men in the audience to
identify with male protagonists' actions, while women in the
movies were typically passive, vitimized, or peripheral to the
main action. The term Gaze originally comes from Lacan, although influential Lacanians have maintained
that it is improperly used in this theory. (Hedges)
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Mimesis
Also see Aristotle:
Key Concepts
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Mirror Stage
Lacan's mirror stage is perhaps best understood as
a metaphor for subjectivity. In the mirror stage, the fragmented
infant identifies with and desires to be like an image of wholeness
(the image in the mirror, the "I" or subject position
that implies a coherent, unified, subjectivity). But while images
of wholeness give us an image of ourselves as distinct from the
world, they never align with us perfectly. There is an inevitable,
structural, gap between the truth of fragmentation (a body that
constantly takes in and spews out matter, a consciousness riven
by representations) and images of self-identity and wholeness.
(Hedges)
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Oedipus Complex (Lacanian)
In the Oedipal Complex, as Lacan imagines
it, the subject passes from a register of imaginary fusions with
the world and with others (The Imaginary) into language (the
Symbolic). Lacan almost describes this as a fall from Eden presence
and fusion with the world into a post-lapsarian world of subject
and object, division and desire.
Lacan's notion of desire is, at its heart, a desire for wholeness--a
"hole in the self" that the subject attempts to close
through an endless, metonymic chain of supplements: the perfect
car, the perfect boyfriend, a tenure track job, etc. But as soon
as one supplement is acquired, desire moves onto something else.
Desire is a (representational) itch that can never truly be scratched.
(Hedges)
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(The) Other
A term from French philosophy that has
several, sometimes overlapping meanings in cultural studies,
including anthropology and psychoanalysis.
1
Most commonly, another person or group of people who are defined
as different or even sub-human to consolidate a group's identity.
For example, the Nazi's internal cohesion depended in part on
how they defined themselves against (strove to maintain distinctions
from) their image of the Jews. In this sense, "The other"
is the devalued half of a binary opposition when it is applied
to groups of people. (See binary opposition.)
2 A
"specular" other. In the thought of Jacques
Lacan, human infants have an image
of themselves as whole before they actually have control over
their bodies. This "mirror phase" in their development
gives them an image of wholeness to strive for, but it is also
alienating because the image in the mirror does not match their
burping, defecating reality. Presumably we might spend our entire
life trying to achieve a kind of wholeness and integration, this
time on a psychic level, that is ultimately at odds with how
our brains and bodies, and certainly language, works. For this
reason, images of our doubles may be experienced as threatening
and sinister (see Dopplegänger).
3
The "symbolic" Other. The Other that is always capitalized.
For Jacques
Lacan and many other French philosophers,
to be is to speak, but to speak is use a system of representations
that precede us. To the extent that our inner thought processes
(how we represent ourselves and our experience to ourselves)
are shaped by language, we are as much "spoken" or
"inscribed" as we are speaking. In this account, our
consciousness is created by a kind of intrusion from the outside,
a kind of alien Other that structures our subjectivity.
(Hedges--I think this owes a lot to
The Feminist Dictionary of Psychoanalysis)
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Overdetermined
A term from psychoanalysis. If something is "Overdetermined,"
it is possible to construct several plausible, non-mutually exclusive
ways to explain it. In such cases, we might use the expression
"both . . . and" instead of "either . . . or."
(Hedges)
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Performative
A term coined by J.
L. Austin. A performative is a semiotic gesture that is a
being as well as a doing. Or, more accurately, it is a doing
that constitutes a being, an activity that creates what it describes.
Performatives are intelligible only within a matrix that is
simultaneously social and semiotic. To borrow one of Austin's
own examples of a performative, "I pronounce you man and
wife" both performs an action and describes a new state
of being. A minister or magistrate's act of describing a couple
as "man and wife" is what makes them so. However, as
Austin himself pointed out, this performative depends on a densely
woven web of social relations that renders it intelligible, believable,
and acceptable. Shift the context of the utterance a little,
say by having someone other than a minister or magistrate say
it, or by directing it at a pair of cats, and it loses its cultural
authority. As Judith Butler
has pointed out such a shift can also parody the dominant conventions,
revealing that they are, in fact, conventions. Directed at a
pair of women lovers, "I now pronounce you man and wife,"
mimics a heterosexual institution but also displaces it, troubling
dominant notions of what it means to be male, female, and married.
(Hedges, from an unpublished article)
Also see JL
Austin: Key Concepts
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Peripeteia
Also see Aristotle:
Key Concepts
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The
Phallus
While all of them agree it's important,
some critics say the term "the Phallus" in Lacan's
work has as many as eight meanings and some as few as one meaning.
One thing everyone pretty much agrees on, though, is that Lacan
tries to maintain a distinction between the Phallus as
a signifier privileged male attributes, and the penis, as a spongy
little organ that can't live up to the Phallus's inflated claims.
(Hedges)
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Postmodernism
See Dubious
Approaches to Postmodernism
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Power/Knowledge
A term Foucault uses to highlight the fact that every description
also regulates what it describes. It is not only that every description
is somewhat "biased, " but also that the very terms
used to describe something reflect power relations. Discourses
promote specific kinds of power relations, usually favoring the
"neutral" person or professional using the discourse
(the lawyer, psychiatrist, professor, doctor, etc.). In other
words, to know is to participate in complicated webs of power.
(Hedges)
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Primal
Scene
The scenario people imagine when they
try to contemplate their own origins. The term is a Freudian one, and in that context refers to imagining
your parents conceiving you, but can be used more loosely to
refer to any such scene of origin. (Hedges)
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Queer
Queerness, in the work of theorists like Judith Butler and
Eve Sedgwick, is as much a semiotic as it is a social phenomenon.
To say that someone is "queer" indicates an indeterminacy
or indecipherability about their sexuality and gender, a sense
that they cannot be categorized without a careful contextual
examination and, perhaps, a whole new rubric. For gender to be,
in Judith Butler's words,
"intelligible," ancillary traits and behaviors must
divide and align themselves beneath a master division between
male and female anatomy.
From people's anatomy, we can supposedly infer other things
about them: the gender of the people they desire, the sartorial
and sexual practices they engage in, the general elements of
culture that they are attracted to or repulsed by, and the gender
of their "primary identification." While in practice
each of these categories is rather elastic, it is usually when
they do not line up in expected ways (say, when a man wears a
dress and desires men) that one crosses from normative spaces
into "queer" ones. In Butler's view, queer activities
like drag and unexpected identifications and sexual practices
reveal the arbitrariness of conventional gender distinctions
by parodying them to the point where they become ridiculous or
ineffective.
(Hedges, from his article, "Howells's 'Wretched Fetishes':
Character, Realism, and Other Modern Instances." Texas
Studies in Literature and Language. 38.1 Spring1996.)
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Simulacrum
"A copy for which there is no original."
Examples would include the hacienda that Taco Bell stores are
based on, Disneyland, MGM Studios, sex in pornography, and 40s
"retro" fashions. The point isn't that there aren't
"real life" models for these things--we could find
a mission church similar to the Taco Bell store--but that the
model becomes more important than any original we might discover.
For example, in pornography you have highly scripted, often impossible
sex that people then attempt to emulate in their lives. The representation
becomes more important than the "thing itself." The
signifier becomes more important than the signified. The term
is central to the work of Baudrillard, althought Deleuze wrote about it much earlier. (Hedges, with
thanks to Steve Krause for the Taco Bell example)
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Subject
Foucault,
Benveniste, Lacan and other thinkers have attracted the attention
of philosophers and cultural critics because they think about
the way that language shapes subjectivity. That is why they use
the term "subject" (a position in a sentence) rather
than "person." Presumably, we come to know ourselves
as distinct identities by interacting with a system of representation
that precedes us. For example, we are gendered by language at
birth ("what is it?--blue cigars or pink ones?") (Hedges)
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The Subject Supposed to Know
In the theories of French philosopher
and psychoanalyst Jacques
Lacan, a putative subject occupying
a representational vantage point from which complete, as opposed
to fragmentary, knowledge is possible. As Robert Frost wrote,
"We all dance round and suppose,/ but the secret sits in
the middle and knows." Lacan's point is that because of
the nature of language, all knowledge is necessarily incomplete,
lacking, and flawed, and this subject is an illusion, although
often a necessary one. (Hedges)
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Textual "Poaching"
A term popularized by the critic Henry
Jenkins. The notion is that readers and viewers aren't simply
passive consumers of texts and shows, but "poach" those
elements which are meaningful to them, often going so far as
to engage in an ongoing struggle with producers over a text or
show's meanings, direction, and significance. I particularly
like the metaphor of poaching because it conjures up images of
wandering around an area that officially does not "belong"
to you and using what you find there for your own purposes, much
as fans do with characters, even a universe, that purportedly
belongs to someone else. (Hedges)
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Universal
In the past, Formalist analysis often
climaxed by demonstrating how a work of art appealed to a universal
human experience or feeling. As more people from diverse cultural
and socioeconomic backgrounds have entered the academy, it has
become much more difficult to appeal to universal human experiences
or characteristics. This is not to denigrate any one's belief
in universal human experiences or a common human nature. But
if you hinge an essay on such a belief, then the focus of your
discussion shifts away from your point about the literature,
and toward the much larger task of convincing your audience that
such universal experience exists (which you're unlikely to do
in a 5 to 15 page paper). (Hedges)
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